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The Politics of (and Behind)
the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage
Mechanism
Elisa Calliari, Swenja Surminski and Jaroslav Mysiak
Abstract Despite being one of the most controversial issues to be recently treated
within climate negotiations, Loss and Damage (L&D) has attracted little attention
among scholars of InternationalRelations (IR). In this chapterwe take the “structural-
ist paradox” in L&D negotiations as our starting point, considering how IR theories
can help to explain the somewhat surprising capacity of weak parties to achieve
results while negotiating with stronger parties. We adopt a multi-faceted notion of
power, drawing from the neorealist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought, in
order to explain how L&D milestones were reached. Our analysis shows that the IR
discipline can greatly contribute to the debate, not only by enhancing understanding
of the negotiation process and related outcomes but also by offering insights on how
the issue could be fruitfullymoved forward. In particular, we note the key importance
that discursive power had in the attainment of L&D milestones: Framing L&D in
ethical and legal terms appealed to standards relevant beyond the UNFCCC context,
including basic moral norms linked to island states’ narratives of survival and the
reference to international customary law. These broader standards are in principle
recognised by both contending parties and this broader framing of L&D has helped
to prove the need for action on L&D. However, we find that a change of narrative
may be needed to avoid turning the issue into a win-lose negotiation game. Instead,
a stronger emphasis on mutual gains through adaptation and action on L&D for both
developed and developing countries is needed as well as clarity on the limits of these
strategies. Examples of such mutual gains are more resilient global supply chains,
reduction of climate-induced migration and enhanced security. As a result, acting on
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L&D would not feel as a unilateral concession developed countries make to vulner-
able ones: it would rather be about elaborating patterns of collective action on an
issue of common concern.
Keywords Loss and Damage · AOSIS · UNFCCC · International relations
Neorealism · Liberalism · Constructivism
6.1 Foundations for an International Relations’
Contribution to the Debate
In recent years, the academic community has made important contributions to the
Loss & Damage (L&D) debate, especially by (i) framing it through a disaster and
climate risk management perspective (Mechler et al. 2014; Fekete and Sakdapolrak
2014; Birkmann and Welle 2015; Mechler and Schinko 2016); (ii) looking at the
connection between L&D and the limits to adaptation (Warner and van der Geest
2013, 2015); (iii) outlining how attribution studies could support the assessment of
L&D (Huggel et al. 2013; James et al. 2014); and (iv) discussing L&D’s connection
with the concept of state responsibility in international law (Tol and Verheyen 2004;
Verheyen 2012, 2015; Mayer 2014; Mace and Verheyen 2016). Some authors have
also provided historical overviews on the emergence of L&D in the international
debate, analysed the role of the UNFCCC in addressing it, and discussed the possi-
ble implications of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) (Huq et al. 2013;
McNamara 2014; Mathew and Akter 2015; Roberts and Huq 2015; Stabinsky and
Hoffmaister 2015). Against this background, contributions by political science and
International Relations (IR) scholars have been almost absent (recent exceptions are
Johnson (2017), Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016) and Calliari (2016a)).
This is only partly surprising. Overall, limited attention has been devoted to cli-
mate change within the discipline, especially when considering adaptation-related
issues (Crump and Downie 2015). While contributions on mitigation are somewhat
more common, where the need for international cooperation is more evident, this
is not the case for adaptation and its (possible) failures and limits (i.e., L&D). Yet,
there are a number of reasons why the current discourse on adaptation and its lim-
its/constraints should be of interest to those exploring global policy and international
power relations (Khan 2016): These include the self-interest of states and how in a
globalised and interconnected world they are exposed to the effects of social, eco-
nomic, political, environmental, and technological events, even when those occur in
a different corner of the world. In addition, norms, values and justice imperatives
also feature as a base for collective action on adaptation (Brown and Weiskel 2002)
and play an even more important role when considering L&D.
Moreover L&D provides a very interesting case to be studied by IR scholars given
the relevance of power dynamics in the climate change negotiations setting and its
complex, asymmetrical and multilateral characteristics. Decision-making under the
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UNFCCC relies on consensus: disagreement around the voting majority required for
certain decisions has until now prevented the adoption of the rules of procedure (draft
art. 42). This implies that, differently from other multilateral fora where each Party is
bestowed a single vote and thus given equal weight, final outcomes in the UNFCCC
will likely mirror Parties’ capacity to shape and influence the decision-making pro-
cess. In this context, it is important to point out that, on their initiative, developing
countries managed to establish the WIM in 2013 and obtain a dedicated article on
L&D in the Paris Agreement in 2015. A leading role in the process was assumed
by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a coalition of small island and low-
lying coastal countries sharing similar development challenges and vulnerabilities to
climate change impacts, and regarded among the most vocal groups in climate talks.
Generally considered as the parties with less negotiation power, at least in terms of
sheer delegation sizes, these achievements appear particularly remarkable.
The case of AOSIS has been characterised as an example of the so-called “struc-
turalist paradox” in negotiations (Betzold 2010), i.e., the case that weaker parties
are often able to effectively negotiate with stronger parties and get something out
of the process (Zartman and Rubin 2002). More specifically, AOSIS’ capacity to
influence the UNFCCC has been explained in terms of moral leadership (de Águeda
Corneloup andMol 2014), capacity to “borrow power” (Betzold 2010), promotion of
collaborative approaches to knowledge building and cooperative institutional mech-
anisms (Larson 2003). While importantly shedding light on a relatively overlooked
topic, these contributions only explore limited timeframes1 and, by design, are not
able to capture evolutions and diversifications in the use of power sources. Moreover,
none of them specifically addresses L&D negotiations, instead applying a broader
adaptation lense.
In this chapter we specifically focus on the L&D process over time in order to
consider its emergence and evolution from the negotiation of the UNFCCC (1991) to
the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (2016). Taking the “structuralist paradox”
in L&D negotiations as our starting point, we look beyond aggregate measures of
power (like GDP, population size or military forces) and consider different sources of
influence thatAOSISmight have activated to shapeL&Doutcomes.We analyseL&D
negotiations through the lenses of the main schools of thought in IR—the neorealist,
liberal and constructivist (Snyder 2004)—to better understand the complexities of
finding international agreement on L&D issues. This approach might look unortho-
dox, given that these schools of thought are based on hardly reconcilable premises.
Nevertheless, conceptual pluralism around the notion of power is much needed to
understand how global outcomes are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005), as dif-
ferent forms of power might capture different and interrelated ways through which
actors are enabled or constrained in pursuing their objectives.
1Betzold (2010) focuses on AOSIS‘s negotiating strategies in the climate change regime from 1990
to 1997; de Águeda Corneloup andMol (2014) consider the period 2007–2009; while Larson (2003)
analysesAOSIS’ 1994 position paper: “Draft Protocol to theUnitedNations FrameworkConvention
on Climate Change on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction”.
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The chapter is organised as follows. We first provide an overview of the L&D
process within the UNFCCC from AOSIS’s first proposals to the PA, looking at
the historic developments and actions by different actors that led to the emergence
of L&D as a pillar of the UNFCCC architecture. We then consider the negotiating
process through the lenses of IR theories to understand how L&D outcomes have
been produced. By analysing the actors involved, their positions, the negotiation
process and related outcomes, we finally identify opportunities, both for research
and policy, to move this contested discourse forward.
6.2 Positioning of L&D in the UNFCCC Negotiations
As discussed in the introductory chapter (Mechler et al. 2018), the debate on L&D
has been spearheaded by AOSIS since the early 1990s, by calling for an insurance
pool to compensate vulnerable small island and low-lying developing countries for
the impacts of sea level rise (INC 1991) (Fig. 6.1).
It took more than 20 years to institutionalise the debate within the UNFCCC
architecture through the creation of the WIM in 2013 and eventually the stipulation
of the stand-alone article 8 in theParisAgreement. Figure 6.2 shows the positioning of
the Executive Committee of theWIM (ExCom), which the COP established to guide
the implementation of functions of the WIM through an initial 2-year work plan, in
the UNFCCC architecture. ExCom is a body constituted under the Convention, and
is guided by and accountable to the COP.
COP 20 finalised the governance of the ExCom by bestowing 10 members each
to Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.2 However, disagreement around regional rep-
resentation within Annex I parties caused substantial delays in nominating ExCom
members, convening of the ExCom first meeting (September 2015), and implement-
ing the activities of the WIM. The balanced representation among Parties is also
reflected in the Chairmanship, with the two Co-chairs being elected from Annex 1
and non-Annex 1 respectively to serve for 1 year.3 The ExCom may establish expert
groups, subcommittees, panels, thematic advisory groups or task-focused ad hoc
working groups to help execute its advisory role.
The initial 2-year work plan of the WIM comprises 9 action areas focusing on:
(1) Particularly vulnerable developing countries, population, ecosystems; (2) Com-
prehensive risk management approaches; (3) Slow onset events; (4) Non-economic
losses; (5) Resilience, recovery and rehabilitation; (6) Migration, displacement and
human mobility; (7) Financial instruments and tools; (8) complementing and draw-
ing upon the work of and involvement other bodies; and (9) development of a 5-
2Members from non-Annex I Parties include 2 members from each of the African, the Asia-Pacific,
and the Latin American and Caribbean States, 1 member from SIDS, 1 member from the LDC
Parties, and 2 additional members from non-Annex I Parties.
3During the first meeting of the ExCom in 2017, co-chairmanship went from Tuvalu and USA to
Jamaica and European Union.
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Fig. 6.2 TheWIM in the UNFCCC architecture. According to Decision 2/CP. 19, theWIM reports
annually to the COP. Source Adapted from own elaboration
year rolling work plan. As for the latter, its strategic workstreams were approved
at COP23 and call for enhanced cooperation on: (1) Slow onset events; (2) Non-
economic losses; (3) Comprehensive risk management approaches; (4) Migration,
displacement and human mobility; and (5) action and support, including finance,
technology and capacity-building.
The “structure, mandate and effectiveness” of the WIM is to be periodically
reviewed, with the first review to be held in 2019 and subsequent ones to take place
no more than 5 years apart (UNFCCC 2017). Reviews should consider progress on
the implementation of the ExCom’s work plan but also adopt a long-term vision to
reflect on how the WIM may be enhanced and strengthened. As an input to the 2019
review, decision 4/CP.22 called for a “technical paper (to) be prepared by the secre-
tariat elaborating the sources of financial support”. At COP 23 it was agreed that the
latter should be informed by an expert dialogue (baptised as “Suva Expert Dialogue”)
that took place in May 2018, in order “to explore a wide range of information, inputs
and views on ways for facilitating the mobilisation and securing of expertise, and
enhancement of support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, for
averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage” (SBI and SBSTA 2017).
Besides the WIM, a major institutional milestone on L&D was reached with the
adoption of the Paris Agreement. A stand-alone article 8 recognises L&D as distinct
from adaptation, elevating it almost as a third pillar of climate action. Through the
article “Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss
and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme
weather events and slowonset events” (UNFCCC2015). The article sanctions the per-
manence of theWIM,whilst leaving the door open for it to be “enhanced and strength-
ened” through futureCOPdecisions. It also calls Parties towork “on a cooperative and
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facilitative basis” to “enhance understanding, action and support” in areas including
early warning systems, comprehensive risk assessment and management, risk insur-
ance facilities, climate risk pooling, and non-economic losses (UNFCCC 2015).
6.3 Actors and Positions in the L&D Debate
The inclusion of L&D as a distinct concept from adaptation in the Paris Agreement
was the result of a series of politically charged negotiations, fuelled by a range of
actors with a variety of viewpoints. The role played by each of these actors, including
their negotiation positions, is briefly discussed in this section.
6.3.1 Developing Countries and Their Representative Groups
As recognised above, developing countries and their representative groups have pro-
vided much of the impetus for the recognition of L&D within the UNFCCC. AOSIS
has been particularly important, having first campaigned for the inclusion of L&D in
climate change negotiations in the early 1990s and continuing to do so in conjunction
with other representative groups. Other key events have included:
• In 2005 at COP11, Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group called for the com-
pensation of climate change damages (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016);
• In 2013, G77 with support from AOSIS and LDCs pushed for (and achieved) the
adoption of the WIM (Calliari 2016a); and
• Prior to the commencement of COP21, members of the G77, China bloc, the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, LDCs, AOSIS and the Africa Group all emphasised
the importance of L&D to the Paris negotiations (Hoffmeister and Huq 2015).
The negotiating position of developing countries in general has been to (i) con-
sider L&D as distinct from adaptation; (ii) treat climate change negotiations as an
appropriate forum to discuss L&D; (iii) hold developed countries liable for L&D;
and (iv) call for compensation (Huq and De Souza 2016). At the same time, they
have raised concerns that the emphasis of L&D discourse on financial compensation
could have a trivialising effect on addressing the underlying needs of developing
countries (Hoffmaister et al. 2014).
6.3.2 Developed Countries
Developed countries have generally been critical and provided the opposite stance to
developing countries on negotiations around L&D. Particular resistance was made
in recognising L&D as distinct from adaptation. This is reflected, for instance, in
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developed countries’ attempts to have L&D treated outside the Paris Agreement
through a COP decision, or inside the text of the agreement but under the same
article as adaptation. As for compensation, any references to such a concept have
mostly been avoided, with developed countries shifting instead the attention to non-
economic L&D, such as “losses of lives and negative impacts for health”, and “loss of
biodiversity and ecosystemservices necessary to sustain livelihoods” (Norway2013).
The US also raised ethical concerns, by claiming that considering compensation
would have meant “put[ting] a monetary value on the lives, livelihoods and assets of
the most vulnerable countries and populations” (UNFCCC 2012a).
Not surprisingly, in Paris they rejected compensatory language (e.g. “rehabilita-
tion”, “compensation” and “liability”) for fear of creating a legal liability for L&D
suffered by developing countries (Huq and De Souza 2016). Former U.S. Secretary
of State JohnKerry explained the US’ reluctance in relation to this as follows: “We’re
not against [loss and damage]. We’re in favour of framing it in a way that doesn’t
create a legal remedy because Congress will never buy into an agreement that has
something like that…the impact of it would be to kill the deal” (Goodell 2015).
Ultimately, Article 8 can be viewed as a compromise for developed countries;
although they conceded the treatment of L&D as a separate pillar for climate action,
they made it clear that they continue rejecting any liability for L&D, and emphasised
a strong role for climate risk management. This attempt to move the L&D discourse
under the less contested and binding disaster risk reduction framework or under
the wider humanitarian arena is not new and has characterised developed countries’
position since the inception of the L&D work programme. A central argument for
it has been the extreme difficulty in attributing “the incidence of loss and damage
to climate change, as opposed to natural climate variability and/or vulnerabilities
stemming from non-climatic stresses and trends like deforestation and development
patterns”, as put by the US (UNFCCC 2012a).
6.3.3 NGOs
Generally speaking, NGOs have been highly supportive of the efforts of developing
countries to create a liability and compensation mechanism for L&D. Such support
has its roots in climate justice considerations; for example, ECO noted at the time of
COP19 that L&D is a matter of “climate justice…It is time for those who are mainly
responsible for climate change to act here inWarsaw” (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016).
In particular, NGOs:
• Haveadvocated for the development of anL&Dmechanism. For example,German-
watch, supported by theMunichClimate Insurance Initiative (MCII) (togetherwith
other partner institutions), launched the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries
Initiative in 2012 (CDKN et al. 2012). Similarly, the ACTAlliance, a network con-
sisting of 140 humanitarian and development organisations, advocated for L&D
during COP19: “Governments should recognise that we cannot choose between
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mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.…The lower the mitigation ambition,
the higher the adaptation need. The lower the adaptation support available to help
poor communities and countries, the more serious the limits to adaptation become
from climatic changes, the more loss and damage ensues” (Vulturius and Davis
2016)
• Have helped to stimulate interest in L&D in developing countries. For example,
LDCs participating in a MCII workshop developed much greater interest in the
development of an L&Dmechanism than they held prior to participation (Vanhala
and Hestbaek 2016);
• Have acted as enablers for change. For example, the pro bono Legal Response
Initiative (LRI)4 operated by WWF-UK and Oxfam-GB has provided legal sup-
port to LDCs during climate change negotiations. A similar role was played by
the Foundation for International Environmental Law andDevelopment (FIELD), a
non-governmental research institute based at the Law Department at SOAS, Uni-
versity of London (see for instance Hyvarinen (2012)). A recent advisory group
employed by the Republic of Marshall Islands and AOSIS is the New York based
Independent Diplomat (Carter 2015);
• Have sought public support on L&D. For example, through reports produced by
ActionAid, Care, and WWF (ActionAid 2010; ActionAid et al. 2012, 2013);
• Have continued to pursue options for compensation outside of climate change
negotiations. For example, Greenpeace has used the Philippines Human Rights
Commission to accuse a number of major companies of human rights abuses for
carbon emissions. The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines contacted
those companies in 2016 to give them an opportunity to respond to Greenpeace’s
allegations (Vidal 2016).
6.3.4 The Private Sector and the Insurance Industry
There is limited evidence of private sector actors playing a role in the development of
L&D as a concept and mechanism, with the exception of some insurance companies.
Indeed, from a private sector point of view, the conceptual separation of L&D, adap-
tation, and disaster risk reduction might appear a highly theoretical and academic
exercise, with limited relevance (Surminski and Eldridge 2015). However, back in
2011, when the UNFCCC consulted on an L&D mechanism, a number of responses
to the UNFCCC called for greater engagement with the private sector in climate risk
management. For example:
• Norway noted that ‘broad participation from stakeholders [including the private
sector] would be crucial to a good outcome of the work programme’ (Norway
2011);
• Gambia asked ‘to seek (private sector) contribution for a successful mechanism
to address L&D in LDCs’ (Gambia 2011)—but explicit detail of what this ‘con-
4http://legalresponseinitiative.org/.
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tribution’ means remains lacking. Gambia also referenced the need to provide the
private sector in LDCs with tools and information to help them respond to the risk
of L&D. The submission specifically mentions ‘climate services for users in both
the public and private sector in LDCs and other vulnerable countries, (… including
the) strengthening of meteorological services in developing countries to facilitate
free sharing of data and information’ (Gambia 2011).
TheWorldHealthOrganization, International LabourOrganization, andUNISDR
have all made similar calls. However, while these submissions point to a clear deficit
in integrating the private sector, they do not provide much detail on the expectations
that come with it. The US has been more specific in explaining the aim of this private
sector engagement: ‘increase collaboration with the private sector (…) to achieve
effective and comprehensive risk management. (…) We should also prioritise the
development of strategies that leverage private sector resources and create market-
based mechanisms that are not overly reliant on public sector budgets, and that are
sustainable in the long term’ (USA 2011).
ExCom’s 2016 report makes several references to the private sector. In particular
the ExCom (SBSTA and SBI 2016):
• has recommended to the COP that the private sector be invited to cooperate and
collaborate on issues relating to L&D where relevant.
• has initiated engagement with the private sector to identify how to enhance the
implementation of comprehensive risk management approaches relating to L&D.
• has reached out to private investors to encourage them to incorporate climate risk
and resilience into development projects.
The only sector that has been engaged in the L&Ddiscussions under theUNFCCC
is the insurance industry. In fact, the dominant focus on insurance-related instruments
within the WIM is likely to have been influenced by the presence and engagement
of these insurance companies.
A particularly prominent role has been played by MCII. MCII was initiated as a
charitable organisation by representatives of insurers, research institutes and NGOs
in 2005 in response to the rising interest in insurance-related solutions for climate
adaptation. It brings together a broad range of insurers, policy researchers, NGOs
and other climate change experts in a single forum. TheUNFCCC is recognised as an
‘observer’ and ‘friend’ of MCII. Between 2008 and 2011, MCII’s submissions to the
UNFCCC focused on the role of insurance for weather-related risks in the context
of adaptation (MCII 2012). Notably, some elements of a 2008 MCII proposal for
a climate risk management module, comprising prevention and insurance pillars to
facilitate adaptation (MCII 2008),were eventually included in theCancunAdaptation
Framework and the SBI Work Program on L&D.
Other parts of the insurance industry are also showing an emerging interest in
L&D. This has been highlighted by the Philippines, which hosted a UNFCCC Stand-
ing Committee on Finance forum in early September 2016. The forum was designed
to support the work of the WIM and ExCom. The programme for the forum was
designed by the UNEP FI Principles for Sustainable Insurance (PSI) Initiative, and
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members of the Philippines insurance industry participated in the forum by provid-
ing technical expertise. A separate event was also hosted by the PSI together with
the Philippines Insurers and Reinsurers Association the day following the forum
(UNEPFI 2016). This event involved discussion of the L&D, and involved members
of ExCom. Chapters 13 (Schäfer et al.) and 21 (Linnerooth-Bayer et al.) of this book
look at the role of insurance for L&D in greater detail.
6.4 The L&D Negotiation Process Through the Lenses
of IR Theories
In the previous section attention was drawn to the different actors involved in L&D
negotiations, describing their positions and contributions. In particular, we empha-
sised that developing countries’ negotiators, includingAOSIS, after long negotiations
managed to reach at least a partial victory in terms of the WIM and Art. 8 of the
Paris Agreement.We now investigate this somewhat surprising victory from different
IR perspectives to better understand the complexities of finding international agree-
ment on L&D solutions. More specifically, we look at L&D negotiations through
the lenses of the main school of thoughts in IR, namely neorealism, liberalism and
constructivism (Snyder 2004). We believe that a pluralistic approach is necessary to
understand how global outcomes are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
In general terms, a neorealist viewpoint is useful to highlight resource-endowment
asymmetries and highlight strategies to overcome them. Neorealism is a very influ-
ential strand in IR and sees states as pursuing their self-interest (which is ultimately
security orwealth) in an international system defined by anarchy. States possess vary-
ing capabilities, or power, that they use to turn deals in their favour. The power States
possess depends on their resource endowment, including the economy, population,
and military forces. Nevertheless, aggregate measures of power might explain little
about power positions when considering a specific bargaining circumstance (climate
talks, in this case). What becomes relevant, instead, is “issue-specific power”; that
is, the amount of relevant resources a Party can use for a specific conflict or concern
(Habeeb 1988). In a multilateral setting such as the UNFCCC, two main resources
acquire particular relevance and are considered for our analysis: delegation size and
capacity.
Liberalism shares some assumptions with realism (anarchy of the international
system and rationality of actors), but rejects power as the sole explaining factor
and stresses the role of international cooperation and mutual benefits in shaping
international outcomes. In particular, liberalism postulates that (i) it is the interde-
pendence among state preferences to influence world politics [that promotes inter-
national cooperation,] and that (ii) states’ preferences mirror the views of some
subset of (domestic) social groups (Moravcsik 2008). The first assumption derives
from the special emphasis liberals place on globalisation as a characteristic of the
international political-economic system. In an interconnected world, characterised
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by high degrees of complexity and feed-back effects, state interactions are daily
occurrences in a number of realms, including society, economy, politics and technol-
ogy. These interactions are fuelled by specific state preferences (as determined by
domestic actors), without which a state would not have any incentive to engage in the
international context. Liberalist lenses are thus useful to investigate how asymmetry
between states’ preferences affect L&D outcomes.
Finally, constructivism is a relatively recent theoretical paradigm, challenging in
many aspects both realist and liberal theories in explaining international negotiations
and power relations. What fundamentally distinguishes constructivism from the for-
mer schools of thought is its ontological assumption of the world as being socially
constructed. This means, as Hurd (2008) puts it, that “how people and states think
and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around
them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about
themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they
participate”. One of the most important contributions of constructivism is showing
that norms matter (Price 2008) and thus ethical and legal standards are important in
guiding world politics (Snyder 2004).
We suggest all these viewpoints are necessary to understand L&D negotiations.
In the following sections we apply such competing theories to the L&D case by
assuming the particular perspective of small island states, AOSIS being their most
proactive proponent on the L&D issue.
6.4.1 Neorealism
In terms of aggregate power, AOSIS—a coalition of socially, economically and envi-
ronmentally vulnerable small island nations—would be defined as a low-power actor
in international negotiations. Its members are home to less than 1% of the world pop-
ulation; the sum of their 39 GDPs equals the annual economy of the city of London5;
and almost half of the states have no or limited armed forces (Barbey 2015). Yet, such
traditional indicators of power might explain little in a specific bargaining situation
like climate negotiations. In this setting, two “issue-specific power” resources acquire
particular relevance: delegation size and capacity. Both are reflections of a country’s
GDP. The size of national budgets influences the number of personnel and experts in
the government and the ministries back home that can develop national negotiation
positions, as well as the size of the delegations (Panke 2012). Developing countries
often cannot afford to send big negotiating teams to COPs, and some initiatives have
been put in place in response to that. One of them is the Trust Fund for Participation
in the UNFCCC established under the Convention, which is nevertheless based on
limited and decreasing voluntary contributions and can only support around two addi-
tional delegates per eligible developing Party (UNFCCC 2016). These circumstances
inevitably hamper developing countries’ full participation in the negotiation process.
5Own calculations based on the World Development Indicators by the World Bank (2015).
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Fig. 6.3 Evolution of Party groupings/coalitions.NoteDev.ing (other) refers toG77&Chinaminus
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Delegations composed of a small number of people only are unlikely to possess the
range of technical expertise needed to follow different negotiation streams and are
physically unable to cover simultaneous or exhaustingly long sessions (Chasek 2005;
Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). The smaller the delegation, the less it will also
be able to participate in the informal side of UNFCCC negotiations (where the most
contentious issues are likely to be solved) and to exploit the networking opportunities
offered by COPs.
AOSIS’ “issue-specific power” is evident when considering the evolution of the
group’s delegations at COPs. A comparison among the sizes of UNFCCC Party-
groupings between 1995 and 2011 (own elaboration based on Böhmelt (2013)6 con-
firms AOSIS as the smallest one, with its size increasing at a slower pace compared
to other non-Annex 1 Parties (Fig. 6.3).7
Although some authors consider size as an indicator of bargaining skills (Weiler
2012), other non-material resources like knowledge and expertise influence Par-
ties’ capacity at the negotiating table. Developing countries are typically ascribed a
“capacity gap”, only partially alleviated by the support offered by non-state actors
(Schroeder et al. 2012). The case of AOSIS is somewhat different as the personal
leadership of its negotiators and the early engagement of NGOs as knowledge bro-
kers turned the group into one of the most vocal and proactive in climate talks. This
is at least true when considering some key issues like the 1.5 °C target, adaptation
and L&D, on which the group has been more cohesive. On topics of specific con-
cern, members have started to increasingly negotiate out of the group, for instance on
6Latest available data.
7We are aware that a more accurate consideration of AOSIS’ resource-endowment in L&D nego-
tiations would require disaggregated data on the number of delegates effectively working on the
issue, to be compared with their counterparts in other groups. Unfortunately this information does
not yet exist.
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the issue of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)
(Betzold et al. 2012).
Yet, it is not just about resources. “Issue-specific power” can be increased using
“behavioural power”, i.e. tactics to alter perceived or real power structures (Habeeb
1988). Teaming up with NGOs was one of the strategies employed by AOSIS to rec-
tify power asymmetries on L&D. The other was to pull resources and gain influence
through coalition-building with other non-Annex I groupings. The alignment with
LDCs, the African Group and the G77+China was arguably a result of a conceptual
“reshaping” of the L&D concept in the 2000s. While originally AOSIS’ claims only
focused on losses resulting from sea level rise (as in its 1991 proposal), consideration
for the residual impacts from slow onset events as a whole and the financial risk asso-
ciated with extremes (e.g. AOSIS 2008) made a stronger case for other developing
countries to support the cause. This is not to say that all these groupings had the
same position on L&D and, even less, the same idea about what L&D is. If AOSIS
stressed the life-threatening dimension of L&D, the LDCs focused more on the con-
nection with development and how L&D could affect the quality of life, livelihoods,
food security, and social fabric at the community/household level. At the same time,
Bolivia defined L&D as lost development opportunities and pointed at the deferral
of payments to international institutions, debt relief and similar measures as a way to
address them (UNFCCC 2012a). However, common denominators laid in the request
for L&D to be a stand-alone pillar in UNFCCC architecture and in the need for sup-
porting developing countries’ limited capacity to address climate change impacts.
The G77+China is worthy of separate consideration. While its position was decisive
for the establishment of theWIM and the creation of a separate article on L&D in the
Paris Agreement (see, for instance, the work done within the AdHocWorking Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action—ADP), future alignment with AOSIS’
positions cannot be taken for granted. This is mainly because of the heterogeneity of
the groupwhichmakes synthesis among its members’ positions challenging to reach.
Recent examples of difficulties in finding common ground include the review of the
WIM at COP22 (Calliari 2016b) and the quarrels between China and AOSIS on the
need (supported by the former) to erase the reference to “particularly” vulnerable
developing countries in defining beneficiaries of L&D support.8
While AOSIS has surely benefitted from liaising with other developing countries
in bringing L&Dhigh on theUNFCCCAgenda, this cannot deterministically explain
why outcomes on L&Dwere obtained. Coalition-building in itself is not a suremeans
for any grouping to impact substantively on negotiations (Cooper and Shaw 2009)
and even less in a consensus-based setting such as the UNFCCC (Deitelhoff and
Wallbott 2012). As the institutional context does not level power asymmetries—-
for instance through a one state-one vote system—weaker Parties will be unable to
succeed by relying on their resource-endowment only. Thus, trying to explain L&D
negotiations through “realist eyes” does not allow for going beyond the “structural-
ist paradox”. It is therefore worth investigating other sources of power beyond the
neorealist perspective to get more insight on how AOSIS’ outcomes on L&D were
obtained.
8Personal observations at COP 22.
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6.4.2 Liberalism
By stressing the role played by preferences, liberals point to their interdependence
as a determinant of bargaining outcomes. Some liberals ascribe particular impor-
tance to economic preferences in determining state behaviour. In the L&D case,
developed countries would be incentivised to support their vulnerable developing
counterparts so as to guarantee their viability as commercial partners or to safe-
guard their delocalised supply-chains. Global trade systems can indeed transmit a
variety of negative impacts, as exemplified by the billion dollar losses incurred by
the American corporation Intel that resulted from the collapse of the Thai electronic
industry following flooding in 2011 (Struck 2011). Actually, this liberal argument
was also employed by AOSIS when it called on the international community to con-
sider the “increased interdependence of global economy and society” and to address
“the cascading effects that climate change impacts in poor and vulnerable regions
can globally have” as it would be “cost-effective” (AOSIS 2008). It is worth noting,
however, that this argument was incidentally used by developing countries and that
they largely approached the debate in ethical and legal terms.
While making the case for increased international cooperation on L&D, liberal
theory also allows for highlighting some of the “hampering factors” that have affected
developing countries in L&D negotiations. These are related to the liberal concep-
tualisation of power, which differs significantly from realist theory. According to
Kehoane andNye (1977), one formof international influence derives from the “asym-
metric interdependence” of preferences among states. The more interdependent a
state is and the more intense its preference for a given outcome, the more power
others potentially have over it (Moravcsik 2008). In other words, the salience an
actor attaches to an issue is inversely linked to its success at the negotiating table
as the actor will be more willing to make concessions to get the result (Schneider
2005). Moreover, salience is linked to the existence of an outside option: if a state
has alternatives to the negotiated agreement it will exploit the circumstance to ask
for a higher “price” to take part in it. Translating this reasoning to L&D negotiations,
it easy to see how AOSIS has negotiated since the beginning from a disadvantageous
position. By virtue of their extreme vulnerability and the existential threat posed
by climate change, small islands states can only rely on ambitious mitigation efforts
and support for adaptation and rehabilitation by developed countries to address L&D.
This has two intertwined implications: (i) as they do not have control over the issue at
stake (mostly in terms of mitigation), small island states can do nothing but wait for
developed countries to act; and (ii) not having bargaining power, small island states
are forced to accept a sub-optimal solution compared to what they would prefer.
Beyond salience, liberals stress the importance that domestic actors have in shap-
ing negotiating outcomes. Governments facing a strong opposition back home—and
thus looking less powerful—can convince counterparts that only a minimum com-
mitment is possible (Schneider 2005). While not really applying to AOSIS’ member
states (as domestic actors should agree with the survival of their country), this can
be observed in a relevant counterpart of the L&D debate: the US. One of the leit-
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motifs of the US delegation at COP21 was that any reference to legal remedies in
the Paris Agreement would have encountered the opposition of the Congress and
had the effect “to kill the deal”. The US ratification constraint (Putnam 1988) forced
AOSIS to put aside their responsibility claims and go for a compromise solution.
Talks between the US and small island states, labelled a “meeting of the minds” by
Secretary Kerry (Friedman 2015), were held at the onset of the second negotiation
week, with Saint Lucia minister Fletcher describing their objective as “ensur[ing]
that everybody was comfortable with the agreement” (CarbonBrief 2015). Yet, the
compromise solution (paragraph 52 of the accompanying decision to the Agreement
excluding basis for any liability or compensation claims) did not make everybody
comfortable. The Philippines expressed deep concern and Bolivia stated that “no
clause can deny people and countries’ rights to ask for compensation” and that “all
the necessary institutional means will be used so that [climate] justice can be made”
(Bolivia 2015).
As made evident by this discussion, a liberalist view of L&D negotiations does
not really help to explain the structuralist-paradox. In fact, it reinforces it. This is the
result of considering, as in realism, negotiation outcomes a function of the (static)
characteristics—being Parties’ features or capabilities—of a particular negotiation.
In other words, for liberals and neorealists it is material power (military hardware,
strategic resources, and money) that ultimately matters (Hurd 2008). On the con-
trary, constructivists argue that both material and discursive power are necessary for
understanding world politics (Hopf 1998).We therefore turn our attention to the con-
structivist approach and the role that ethical and legal discourses have had in shaping
L&D negotiations.
6.4.3 Constructivism
Along the constructivism line, L&D negotiations would have been shaped not only
by material power or state interest but also by a competition between states around
different understandings and framings (i.e. discourses) of L&D. Developing coun-
tries have largely framed L&D in ethical and legal terms and made a case for this
conceptualisation since the beginning of climate talks. They have pointed to the
unfairness of climate change (affecting first those least responsible for the problem)
and to the threats for survival it poses for the most exposed societies. By analysing
developing countries’ submissions to the SBI and ADP (2011–2015) and High Level
Segment statements from COP 16 to COP 21 (see Calliari (2016a) for the material
employed), it is possible to find references to the concepts of fairness, international
solidarity; equity and intergenerational equity. The legal counterpart of these ethi-
cal arguments is the concept of state responsibility–compensation (see Chap. 7 on
legal issues: Simlinger and Mayer 2018), which seeks reparation for wrongful acts
attributable to states. In terms of citation frequency, this is the most-cited principle
in the (wide) sample of submissions we analysed, and it is often accompanied by
the Polluter Pays Principle; Common but differentiated responsibility and respective
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capabilities (CBDR-RC) and references to precautionary measures. On the contrary,
as explained above, developed countries have mostly avoided any references to com-
pensation, and have tried instead to shift the attention to non-economic L&D. This
is interesting if we consider that, up to the establishment of the WIM, developing
countries tended to associate L&D to (in principle) the quantifiable and monetisable
effects of climate change, like physical impacts—e.g. loss of land because of sea
level rise—and economic impacts, such as the loss of development opportunities
advanced by Bolivia (UNFCCC 2012a). As a whole, developed countries have tried
to shift L&D to the less contested DRR and humanitarian frameworks; used scientific
knowledge (issues of attribution) to neutralise the developing Parties’ compensation
claims; and employed ethical claims to avoid the ‘monetisation’ of the discourse, by
hinting at the inappropriateness of placing price tags on the lives, livelihoods and
assets of the most vulnerable societies (Calliari 2016a).
If power, in a simplified constructivist view, is about “convince[ing] others to
adopt [ones] ideas” (Snyder 2004), can AOSIS be deemed successful on the L&D
issue? Can the WIM and Article 8 be seen as a result of AOSIS’ discursive power?
Undoubtedly, the developing countries managed to institutionalise the idea of L&D
as something beyond adaptation both in the text of Decision 2/CP.19 establishing
the WIM and with a stand-alone article for L&D in the Paris Agreement. Thus, they
were able to “convince” developed countries on this point. The result was obtained by
framing the L&D debate in such a way that Parties’ resources and interests became
irrelevant as the playground was moved into the legal and moral fields. While nar-
ratives of survival (and thus moral issues) have also been employed by AOSIS in
other UNFCCC negotiation streams (for instance, in asking for ambitious mitigation
actions), the massive recourse to state Responsibility-compensation claims was the
main factor in determining AOSIS’ outcomes. It can be argued that, rather than being
an objective per se, calls for compensation were used strategically to get concessions
from Annex 1 Parties. This idea is somehow reinforced when looking at the timing
of compensation claims (Table 6.1).
Most of them concentrated before 2013, at the time of the discussion for an
institutional mechanism to address L&D (what was going to be the WIM). After
that, reference was made episodically by AOSIS and the G77+China in the proposal
for a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility. Among the performed
functions, the facility was to provide “compensation measures for people displaced
by climate change”—a provision that was dropped without excessive clamour on the
road to Paris. And while at COP 21 requests for compensation were “traded” for a
dedicated L&D article, they reappeared in a number of interpretative declarations to
the instruments of ratification of the Paris Agreement (see Bolivia, the Philippines,
Nauru, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu). This is not
to imply that such calls for retributive justice were not genuine: they are consistent
with the unfairness that developing countries ascribe to the climate change problem.
However, some tactical considerations are discernible behind their use in climate
talks.
In terms of the “status” that L&D has in the UNFCCC architecture, AOSIS and
other developing countries were less successful in “convincing” their counterparts
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Table 6.1 Party/Grouping calling for compensation in the period 1991–2016
Year Party/grouping
1991 AOSIS
2008 AOSIS; Sri Lanka
2009 Brazil; Colombia; India; Nicaragua on behalf of Guatemala, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Panama and Nicaragua; Turkey; Tuvalu; Cook Island;
Algeria on behalf of the African group; AOSIS; Bolivia;
2010 Bolivia; Ghana; AOSIS; Maldives; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on
behalf of Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua; Alba;
2011 Mexicoa, Sri Lanka
2012 AOSIS; Gambia for the LDCs; Swaziland for the African Group; Ghana;
Bolivia with Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, Philippines,
Nicaragua;
2013 AOSIS
2014 Central American Integration System (SICA, in Spanish)
2015 (pre-PA) AOSIS, G 77
2015–2016
(post-PA)
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cook Islands; Micronesia (Federated States of); Nauru;
Niue; Solomon Islands; Tuvalu
aMexico does not properly call for compensation, but rather highlights it among the mechanisms
that could be “identified, prioritised and developed”
in placing L&D as a truly third pillar of climate action. In particular, L&D does not
seem to be placed on an equal footing with mitigation and adaptation in the climate
regime designed by the Paris Agreement as no reference is made to Article 8 by other
treaty provisions. It is not mentioned in the purpose of the Agreement (Article 2), in
the context of the “ambitious efforts” required to achieve it (Article 3), in the related
transparency framework (Article 13), or in the global stocktake process (Article 14).
This signals not only the “last minute” nature of the agreement reached at COP 21,
but also—and most importantly—the contested status that L&D continues to have
under the UNFCCC. Besides the symbolic meaning of keeping L&D separate from
adaptation, Article 8 contains nothing more than tentative and cautious language.
6.5 From Theory to Practice: Next Steps and Key
Questions for Moving the L&D Discourse Forward
Despite being one of the most controversial issues to be recently treated within cli-
mate negotiations, L&D has attracted little attention among IR scholars. Yet, the
discipline can greatly contribute to the debate, not only by enhancing understand-
ing of the negotiation process and related outcomes but also by offering insights on
how the issue could be fruitfully moved forward. This chapter specifically adopted a
multi-faceted notion of power, drawing from the neorealist, liberal and constructivist
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schools of thought, in order to explain how L&D milestones were reached. This
allowed for overcoming the “structuralist paradox” in negotiations, i.e. the appar-
ently surprising capacity of weak parties to take home results while negotiating with
stronger parties.
Developing countries’ achievements on L&D (WIM and Article 8) are only sur-
prising when considering power in its purely materialistic form. If discursive power
is added to the picture, then achievements can be ascribed to developing countries’
capacity to shape their fate rather than to fortunate circumstances. This is not to
say that material power does not play any role. Developing countries are faced with
resource and capacity constraints which make it harder for their needs to be fully
addressed within the UNFCCC. Consistently, NGO support will continue to play a
crucial role in levelling current asymmetries in terms of capabilities, together with
other initiatives to fund developing countries’ participation in the process.
Yet, other sources of power besides the realist and liberal ones can be decisive
for obtaining desired international outcomes. Our analysis has shown the key impor-
tance that discursive power, by framing L&D in ethical and legal terms, had in the
attainment of L&D milestones. First, it moved the debate to a playground where
resources and interests became irrelevant, therefore putting developed and develop-
ing countries on an equal foot. Second, it appealed to standards somehow shared
or agreed beyond the UNFCCC context, including the basic moral norms linked to
island states’ narratives of survival and the reference to international customary law
(state responsibility-compensation principles). This was useful to prove the need for
action on L&D recurring to standards in principle recognised by both contending
parties in other international arenas. Although this was not enough to impose devel-
oping countries’ view on what L&D is and how it should be addressed, it at least
moved developed countries’ position towards the direction paved by the former.
At the same time, however, this strategy prevented Parties from starting a process
towards the creation of shared meaning and understanding around L&D. Indeed,
definitional issues have been carefully avoided in order not to stumble into the taboo
reference of ‘compensation’. As a result, no official definition of L&D has been
agreed at the UNFCCC level yet and Parties rely on a working one formulated under
the SBI (UNFCCC 2012b). This is not just a matter of form, but a more impor-
tant matter of substance. Without clarity around L&D conceptual boundaries, it will
ultimately be difficult to go beyond the explorative mandate the WIM was given.
In particular, concrete guidance is needed in order to implement the WIM’s third
function on enhancing “action and support to address loss and damage”, which also
includes finance. For example, there is a need for establishing relevant criteria to
identify L&D projects on the ground, as well as defining the level of adaptation
beyond which L&D materialises. Does L&D arise when social, technical and phys-
ical limits are surpassed, or should also economic and institutional constraints be
considered? The answers cannot but be political.
Yet, we are not claiming that agreeing on a definition is the only way to have
meaningful action on L&D. We are aware that the discussion still causes discom-
fort and may lead to political deadlock. We thus believe that a more fruitful way
forward entails adopting a different perspective and agreeing on shared principles
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against which action could be tested (see chapter on justice by Wallimann-Helmer
et al. 2018). Such shared principles would support an L&D working space where
solutions can be developed (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018), including tools
to address irreversible losses, which are mostly associated with slow-onset events.
While there is general accord around the use of comprehensive risk management
approaches (including risk assessment, reduction, transfer, retention), how to deal
with impacts from slowonset events remains an open question. Discourse about those
impacts and efforts to develop creative or transformative instruments in response has
been somewhat limited, often hampered by the taboo of compensation. A change
of narrative is therefore needed. Framing L&D exclusively in terms of justice might
have turned the issue into a win-lose negotiation game. Instead, a bigger emphasis on
mutual gains through adaptation and action on L&D for both developed and devel-
oping countries is needed, as well as more clarity on the limits of those strategies.
Examples of such mutual gains are more resilient global supply chains, reduction of
climate refugees and enhanced security. As a result, acting on L&Dwould not feel as
a unilateral concession developed countries make to vulnerable ones: it would rather
be about elaborating patterns of collective action on an issue of common concern.
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